Hedging natural gas price risk by electric utilities : a comparison of fuel switching to financial contracts by Felder, Frank Andrew
Hedging Natural Gas Price Risk by Electric Utilities:
A Comparison of Fuel Switching to Financial Contracts
by
Frank Andrew Felder
B.A., Mathematics and B.S., Applied Mathematics
Columbia University, 1987
Submitted to the Department of
Nuclear Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Technology and Policy
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 1994
Copyright Frank Andrew Felder
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute
publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in
part.
Signature of Author..........................................................
Department of Nuclear Engineering
May 6, 1994
Certified by........................ ....... ........ -.................
Dr. A. Denny Ellerman
Executive Director, Center for Energy ahd Environmental Policy Research
Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
Accepted by....................... .......................................
Professor Richard de Neufville
Chairman, Technology and Policy Program
Accepted by....... ............................. .... ............. ........................................
Professor Allan Henry
Departmentl Committee on Graduate Students
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
jUN 30 1994 Science
UBRARMi
____ -LIIIIYII·*·sll-^LI1111   - --- -I
Hedging Natural Gas Price Risk by Electric Utilities:
A Comparison of Fuel Switching to Financial Contracts
by
Frank Andrew Felder
Submitted to the Department of
Nuclear Engineering on May 6, 1994 in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in
Technology and Policy
A bstract
Electric utilities making baseload expansion decisions are trying to
measure the implications of uncertainty and variability in future natural gas
prices, to evaluate different strategies in mitigating these consequences,
and to provide an useful tool to communicate these results to their
regulators. This thesis attempts to address these objectives in the context
of the New England region of the United States. It is primarily directed at
regulators and utility managers. The goals of this thesis are not only to
provide some insight into these issues, but also to present an accessible tool
that is easily implemented. Specifically, the goal is to answer two questions:
Should electric utilities adopt measures to mitigate the risk of natural
gas price increases?
Assuming that some type of hedging strategy should be adopted,
should utilities use fuel switching or financial contracts as a means of
protecting themselves from natural gas price increases?
A random walk model is constructed to address these questions. The
results of the model suggest that electric utilities are not exposed to large
fuel risk on a per kilowatt basis, assuming that past estimates of natural gas
price volatility are reasonable estimates of future price movements.
Moreover, fuel switching strategies, such as building coal plants to diversify
away from natural gas, are an expensive option. Financial options, such as
fixed price fuel contract, may provide a less expensive solution.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Denny Ellerman
Tittle: Executive Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy
Research and Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Overview of Thesis and Chapter One
Electric utilities making baseload expansion decisions are trying to
measure the implications of uncertainty and variability in future natural gas
prices, to evaluate different strategies in mitigating these consequences,
and to provide an useful tool to communicate these results to their
regulators. This thesis attempts to address these objectives in the context
of the New England region of the United States. It is primarily directed at
regulators and utility managers. The goals of this thesis is not only to provide
some insight into these issues, but also to provide an accessible tool that is
easily implemented. Specifically, the goal is to answer two questions:
Should electric utilities adopt measures to mitigate the risk of natural
gas price increases?
Assuming that some type of hedging strategy should be adopted,
should utilities use fuel switching or financial contracts as a means of
protecting themselves from natural gas price increases?
Chapter one serves as introduction and motivation. Chapter two
explains why a Monte Carlo simulation is used and describes it in detail.
The third chapter reports the results, and chapter four discusses their
implications and limitations by placing the conclusions in a policy
framework.
This chapter motivates the thesis and consists of two sections. Section
8
___ __
one describes the characteristics of natural gas combined cycle plants that
make this technology an attractive baseload fuel. This section also
documents the national and regional trend towards natural gas use in
power generation and presents some drawbacks. The three major
disadvantages are price variability, price uncertainty, and supply reliability.
The second section explains why a comparison is made between coal and
natural gas baseload plants and how this comparison is modeled.
Section One: Attractiveness and Vulnerabilities of Natural Gas Fired Plants
The attractiveness of natural gas as a fuel for electric power
generation is well documented (Jaffe and Kalt, p.5.). It has significant lower
capital cost, technological, and environmental advantages over other
fuels, such as coal, oil, nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewables. Nuclear
power is not a viable option in the near or medium term, particularly in New
England. Its environmental problems, large costs, and poor public
perception prevent this technology from being a power source within the
next twenty years (EPRI, 1990, Vol. 1, p. 107 & p. 2). Oil is not considered an
appropriate baseload fuel compared to natural gas because it suffers the
same price volatility and supply risk as natural gas at a higher total cost
while being less environmentally benign. The Northeast has been heavily
dependent on oil and contains half of the oil-only capacity for the entire
country (EPRI, 1990, Vol. 1, p. 107). Since the first oil shock, the region has
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attempted to diversify away from this fuel source.
Hydroelectric power is well developed in this region, and a large
scale expansion is not feasible. Moreover, hydroelectric power is starting
to be viewed not as a renewable, clean fuel supply, but as a power source
with environmental consequences. Renewables are not currently a major
baseload option in the region because the technology is not sufficiently
developed at low enough costs. Solar energy suffers from excessive costs
as well as poor New England weather conditions. Although wind power
has potential in the region, particularly Maine, it has not proven
technologically capable of being a baseload power supply.
The main competitor to natural gas is coal. Coal fired power plants
suffer from large capital costs and environmental concerns when
compared to natural gas. These environmental concerns also included
potentially regulated emissions, such as carbon dioxide. However, coal
plants have the advantage of a more stable and lower fuel price.
Section two develops this comparison further.
The advantages of natural gas compared to other alternatives are
reflected in the strong trend in the use of natural gas fired generation, both
by electric utilities and nonutilitiy generators (NUGs) in the United States.
The natural gas growth rate will be substantial, potentially doubling new
generation usage over the next 15 years (EPRI 1992 p. S-2). As of 1990, gas-
fired combined cycle and combustion-turbine units accounted for 44
10
percent of planned electric utility capacity additions through 2000.
Including NUGs, the total new gas-fired capacity is over 50 percent (EPRI
1992 p. S-2&3). Electric utilities are planning to add over 11,000 megawatts
(MW) of combined-cycle capacity between the years 1990 and 2000 (EPRI
1992 p.S-4). These plants will be used both as base-load units at capacity
factors of 70-80 percent and intermediate electric load (EPRI 1992 p.S-5).
Table 1.1 compares the projected shares of generation by fuel type
between 1990 and 2010.
Table 1.1: Projected Shares of Generation by Fuel Type: 1990 and 2010
I Fuel 1989 2010
Coal 56% 53%
Oil 6% 4%
Natural Gas 10% 17%
Nuclear 19% 14%
Renewable/Other 10% 12%
ource: Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1989 (p. 15), and Annua
Energy Outlook 1992 for 2010 projection. Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.
This national trend is reflected in the New England. The Analysis
Group for Regional Electricity Alternatives (AGREA) at the M.I.T. Energy
Laboratory evaluates potential strategies for the region in collaboration with
its advisory group, which consists of regulators, utility executives, and
environmental and consumer groups. As a result, AGREA studies reflect the
interests and concerns of the regional stakeholders in the electric utility
arena. Recent reports by the AGREA project team to its advisory panel
document the attractiveness of natural gas and the corresponding concern
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of being overdependent on this fuel (AGREA).
As a specific example, New England Electric System (NEES) published
a report stating that in 2010 its energy mix would include almost 60 percent
natural gas as a fraction of kilowatthours (KWh) (NEESPLAN 4, p. 18). The
report states unequivocally: "History has dramatically demonstrated the
price volatility inherent in overdependence on any fuel source (NEESPLAN
4, p. 18)." The report continues, "If we rely exclusively on natural gas,
today's fuel of choice, to fill the future unspecified need, we would not
have a diverse energy mix....So, while we plan to increase the percentage
of natural gas in our energy mix, we are committed to identifying and
expanding the range of cost-effective fuel choices available to us
(NEESPLAN 4, p. 18)." NEES's fears are well founded: investors view
overdependence on natural gas as a risk due to its price volatility and
questionable reliability (Jaffe, p. 19).
The assumption behind the desire for a diverse fuel mix is that to
hedge natural gas' price movements other fuels must be used. NEES makes
this assumption explicit in NEESPLAN 4 by citing their biomass gasification
project, their Green Request for Proposal, and advances in clean coal
technologies as alternatives to natural gas (NEESPLAN 4, p. 18). However,
financial instruments, such as contracts, options, futures, and other
derivatives, provide another category of tools that can mitigate price risk.
By quantifying the implications of natural gas price movements on power
12
plant expansion decisions, these financial alternatives can be evaluated.
It is important to state clearly what is meant by natural gas price risk,
which has two components. One is variance, or the fluctuation of price
around a mean. The other is uncertainty, or what the mean will be. These
components together will be referred to as volatility. The other perceived
drawback of natural gas - its fuel source reliability - is not addressed
explicitly in this thesis. Historically, there have been legitimate concerns
over receiving natural gas deliveries. For example, the severe weather
during the winter of 1976/1977 caused large supply interruptions (EPRI 1991,
p. S-l). However, since then the natural gas industry has been
deregulated, which has removed the price controls that impacted both
production and demand that led to such curtailments. In the most recent
cold weather spell (winter of 1993-1994), there were none of the delivery
problems experienced in the past, something that the industry has been
waiting to see proven (WSJ, 2/8/94).
Besides deregulation, there are other reasons why natural gas
reliability does not need to be examined explicitly. The amount of natural
gas storage has increased by 1.6 trillion cubic feet (TCF) since 1976, which
allows for a buffer supply to ride out cold weather. This increase was a key
factor in improving the reliability of the natural gas industry during
December 1989's double freeze (EPRI 1991, p. 3-5). (Double freeze refers to
a situation when cold weather increases natural gas demand and hampers
13
production efforts.) There also has been significant construction of natural
gas pipelines in the Northeast. TransCanada PipeLines is spending more
than $2.3 billion on pipelines with 73% going to the Northeast. An additional
$500 million is being spent by the Iroquois Pipeline, again with most of this
investment directed at the Northeast's gas markets. This $3 billion plus
investment, not including other smaller regional pipeline expansions, is
equivalent to more than 2 years of total U.S. pipeline expenditures at recent
rates (EPRI 1990, Vol 1, p. 108).
A portion of natural gas delivery risk can be addressed by
diversification. Natural gas has two types of delivery risk: random events
that do not depend on the weather, and weather related risk. The use of
different suppliers and transporters can reduce some of this non-weather
risk. Moreover, coal itself has some delivery risk, for instance strikes that
interrupt coal delivery, whether they are by coal miners or railroads workers
or even cold weather. Of course, the difficulty of storing natural gas on
power plant sites compared to that of coal, makes natural gas disruptions
a more severe problem. The use of certain types of oil such as distillate as
a fuel substitute in the event of natural gas supply disruptions can be
viewed as an alternative but expensive way to store natural gas. Natural
gas delivery fears can also be addressed by the buyer paying a price
premium, whether this premium is for a backup oil reserve or to ensure
delivery priority ahead of others (EPRI, 1990, Vol 1, p. 30).
14
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Section Two: Why a Baseload Comparison is Made Between Coal and
Natural Gas
Natural gas technologies are compared to coal for several reasons.
Since coal is the closest competitor to natural gas as a baseload fuel,
particularly in cost and reliability, an analysis of these two fuels provides a
measure of natural gas vulnerability to fuel price changes. Second, even
if another technology is superior to natural gas, across what ever dimension,
this comparison will still be useful because it is what electric utilities in the
region are currently evaluating. New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) and
New England Power Planning (NEPLAN) in their 1991 Summary of the
Generation Task Force Long-Range Study Assumptions only consider wood
and wind as possible renewables and only to a limited degree (NEPLAN
1991).
Finally, coal price volatility is very low compared to natural gas
volatility. This means that coal provides a natural comparison to gas
because coal does not have the price volatility that natural gas has.
Moreover, even if coal had a larger price volatility, its impact on the total
cost of producing electricity is small because of the low fuel cost of coal
relative to natural gas, and the large capital cost of a coal plant. In the
case of renewable energy sources, if they do become more economical
compared to coal, then the approach used by this analysis is still valid.
Renewables are similar to coal fired technologies: their fuel prices are
15
relatively small compared to their capital costs and their fuel price volatility
is tiny compared to natural gas. The only exception to this general
characterization is wood fuel power plants.
A baseload comparison between natural gas and coal is modeled
for several reasons. As an intermediate (load following) fuel or as a
peaking energy supply, natural gas dominates coal. Natural gas
generation technologies have the ability to start-up quickly and respond to
demand fluctuations, whereas coal technologies do not. The intrinsic
disadvantage of natural gas - its fuel price volatility - is less important in a
peaking facility, which provides capacity (MW), not energy benefits (KWh)
to electric utilities. Moreover, the large difference in capital costs between
natural gas fired units and coal more than compensates for the higher fuel
costs for intermediate and peaking plants that operate less than baseload
units. To analyze natural gas price movements, these price changes are
modeled stochasticly. A Monte Carlo simulation is conducted, using past
price movement as an indication of future movements.
The selection of specific natural gas and coal technologies to be
compared is based on several factors. First, the technologies must meet
the Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements for the year 2000. A pulverized coal-
fired unit with gas flue desulfurization system is the technology modeled.
An advanced coal technologies was not selected because there is little
United States experience with these technologies; in fact, the region's
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planning group, NEPLAN, calls these coal technologies
"advanced/unproven" (NEPLAN 1991). An existing natural gas combined
cycle is used for the natural gas plant. In any event, if this modeling
approach is used by electric utilities, they will incorporate their own
assumptions about what power plant fuels and technologies will be
competing with natural gas as base load fuel.
The model compares the cost of a natural gas fired plant with a coal
plant; the capacity (MW) of the plants are selected in order to provide
identical energy benefits (KWh) using each technology's availability factor.
The difference in cost after including capital and operating and
maintenance (O&M) expenses, depends on the random movement of
natural gas prices. The model generates a pre-tax net present cost (NPC)
distribution, which can be used to evaluate the price risk associated with
natural gas fired plants. This approach is commonly known as risk analysis
or risk simulation (Park and Sharp-Bette, Chapter 12). The resulting
distribution provides an ex ante evaluation that building a coal plant will
protect a utility from natural gas price risk. Unfortunately, an ex post
evaluation may give a different conclusion. After the coal plant's capital
cost, which are both fixed and sunk, are paid for, a utility would rather
operate a coal unit than a natural gas fired one due to the difference in
variable costs.
This tension between an ex post and ex ante evaluation results in a
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conflict between economic dispatch and long-term gas contracting, which
EPRI has identified as the "most important single problem facing the region"
in terms of the use of natural gas to fuel power plants (EPRI, 1990, Vol 1, p.
108). Since Northeastern power plants are dispatched regionally, out-year
price guarantees cannot be given to power producers by power
purchasers. However, these guarantees are instrumental in securing bank
financing for pipeline expansions and NUG capacity additions. The
implications of the different conclusions that an ex post and an ex ante
evaluation may give are discussed in chapter four. However, an ex ante
evaluation is an appropriate starting point for examining a capacity
expansion decision.
A NPC technique is used instead of a revenue requirement method,
which is the industry's traditional approach, for three reasons. First, given
the trend towards market deregulation particularly in power generation,
NPV analysis is the correct method of evaluating investment alternatives
(Brealey & Myers, Chapter 5). The existence of NUGs, which do not
operate under cost of service regulations, are a specific example this
phenomenon. Secondly, under consistent assumptions, after tax cash flow
NPC analysis is equivalent to popular variants of revenue requirement
methods (Park & Sharp-Bette, p. 649). Finally, this same Monte Carlo
approach can be used with revenue requirement methods. The next
chapter justifies using a Monte Carlo model and presents its details.
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Chapter 2
Model Justification and Description
Chapter Overview
This chapter justifies and describes in detail the model and
assumptions used to analyze natural gas price volatility. It is divided into
three sections. Section one articulates the reasons behind selecting a
Monte Carlo simulation. It presents evidence that past predictions of
natural gas prices have been poor and may be susceptible to bias.
Moreover, it describes the limitations of analysis that depends only on
deterministic forecasts. The benefits of using a Monte Carlo simulation to
model natural gas prices as a random walk are discussed. The second
section presents the statistical analysis supporting the use of a random walk.
Section three provides a detail listing of the assumptions used in the model,
and section four describes how the model is constructed.
Section One: Model Justification
Past Forecasting Errors of Natural Gas Prices
Long range (two years or greater) forecasts are notoriously poor.
Mintzberg (1994, p. 229-30) cites a review (Hogarth and Makridakis) of
forecasts in the fields of population, economics, energy, transportation, and
19
technology. These fields are "characterized by much experience and
expertise in making forecasts as well as readily available data (Hogarth and
Makridakis, p. 122)." The reviewers conclude that errors varied between a
few to several hundred percentage points and contained systematic
biases. Moreover, it could not be determined beforehand which
forecasting technique or forecaster would have been right or wrong:
choosing a forecast is as difficult as making one.
In particular, past estimates of medium to long term fossil fuel prices
have been inaccurate. Comparing predictions of oil prices made during
the energy crisis of the early 1970s to actual prices in 1994 suggest that
forecasters are prone to error. These large errors have caused one
commentator to write, "But the lack of attention to the oil forecasts
themselves has led many to overlook the historical record of these
expectations, which has been so bad that long-term oil market forecasting
has often been described as virtually impossible (Lynch 1992, p. 1)." In the
case of natural gas, predicted versus actual discrepancies are large. Table
2.1 presents three forecasts made in 1985 for gas prices in 1990.
Table 2.1 Forecast Error for 1985/190 Period
Forecast 1990 Actual 1990 Error
($/MMBtu) ($/MMBtu) (abs.)
DOE/EIA 3.22 1.52
GRI 3.60 1.70 1.90
DOE/NEPP 3.51 1.81
Source: Lynch & Swanson 1 93, Volume 2, Table 111-3.
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From these price forecasts errors, Lynch and Swanson conclude:
The consistency in price forecasts is particularly
interesting, though, suggesting that, as with oil
forecasting, a desire to be within the consensus is an
exogenous influence on forecasters. The fact that only
minor price changes were foreseen (all increases),
whereas the price actually plummeted indicates that
the forecasts are constrained by beliefs that prices can
only increase (Lynch and Swanson, 1993, p. 111-3).
These errors in forecasting should come as no surprise. The paradox is as
the world becomes more unpredictable, the more forecasts and
predictions are relied upon to determine what should be done (Gimpl and
Dakin, p. 125, quoted in Mintzberg, p. 235). Not only do forecasting errors
result, but so do the negative consequences of actions taken based on
those forecasts.
Lynch and Swanson state (p. 111-8) that there are three major
problems with long-term natural gas price forecasting. First, there is an
inherent belief in higher prices and resource constraints. "Oil and natural
gas, like all depleting resources, have always been subject to the concern
that the industry will ultimately exhaust supply or that exploration and
development costs will become unacceptably high (EPRI, 1990, Vol. 1, p.
29)." However, in a study comparing volatilities of ten commodities - oil,
copper, lead, zinc, tin, aluminum, nickel, gold, silver, and wheat - from 1985
to 1991, the authors conclude: "All of them exhibit periods of price
increases and periods of price decreases, with no strong time trends
evident (Plourde and Watkins, 1993, p. 2)." The second source of errors
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noted is that long term gas forecasting is influenced heavily by the near-
term market. Finally, natural gas forecasting suffers from the errors in oil
price forecasting. (See Lynch, 1992, for an analysis of the bias in oil price
forecasting.)
Another possible source of errors is failure to consider technological
improvements. Calantone (1992) argues that, "incorporation of
technological change in the wide sense can dramatically alter our view of
the long-run cost of (natural gas) supply. Even at very low forecast levels
of technological change, the expectations for supply costs are strikingly
different from the standard fixed technology approaches (p. 10)." One
specific example of technology increasing natural gas reserves is the
recovery of tight gas sand and coal seam gas, which has increased
estimates of United States reserves by 450 trillion cubic feet (TCF) (Enron,
1992, p. 9; EPRI 1990, Vol. I, pp. 29-30, & p. 37). These improvements
include advances in selecting drilling sites and resource recovery methods.
The point of the above discussion is not to paint a bearish price
outlook for natural gas but to emphasize that experts do not know future
natural gas price levels within a degree of accuracy necessary for power
generators to make large capital commitments with certainty. Furthermore,
the discussion suggests that their may be some forecast bias. The fact that
bias may enter into price predictions is important, because if this is the
case, it is influencing the amount of natural gas in utilities' fuel mixes.
22
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Aside from potential bias in price estimates, there are several major
relationships that must be predicted correctly in order to make intelligent
estimates of future natural gas prices. 'They are: (1) world oil prices; (2) the
flexibility of the dual-fired market to switch to alternate fuels as a means of
moderating gas price increases; and, (3) the nature of the gas resource
base (EPRI, 1990, Vol. I, p. 5)." Each of these items are difficult to predict.
The lack of success of anticipating world oil prices has already been
discussed. It is further complicated by OPEC's attempts to maintain cartel
discipline when there is an oversupply of oil on world markets (EPRI 1990,
Vol. I, p. 5).
The ability of dual fired boilers to switch between fuels may be
restricted by regulatory policy. "A major uncertainty surrounding interfile
competition is how much emerging air quality legislation will restrict the
ability of dual fuel users to switch to alternate fuels when gas prices get out
of line (EPRI 1990, Vol. I, p. 6)." Finally, experts disagree on the amount of
coupling between higher wellhead prices and gas drilling. Higher natural
gas prices will increase drilling; the question is what price levels will cause
drilling that will result in additional proven reserves? Supply elasticities have
been estimated between 0.05 and 3.29 (EPRI 1990, Vol. II, p. 46). Given the
uncertainties that exist in predicting relationships that influence future
natural gas prices, it is not surprising that price forecasts have a far greater
variation than other types of forecasts, such as consumption volume
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estimates (EPRI, 1990, Vol. I, p. 9).
Deterministic Models Provide Limited Information
Even if predictions were more accurate, their use in deterministic
models does not provide decision makers with all of the information that
they need. A typical example of how the industry analyzes future gas
prices is the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report on Natural Gas
Requirements for Electricity Generation Through 2000: Can the Natural Gas
Industry Meet Them? (EPRI, 1990). The report examines over twenty natural
gas supply and demand forecasts and over fifty different scenario estimates
(EPRI, 1990, Vol. I, p. 4). The predictions are reported under different
categories, such as base case, high oil price, low oil price, low resource
base, high demand, high supply, and potential. The base case represents
the most likely or expected future.
These different estimates provide future natural gas price streams that
planners use to conduct their sensitivity analysis. Of course, the different
scenarios that are constructed should include the situation that planners
are concerned about. In the case of the twenty forecasts reviewed by this
EPRI report, none of them considered the possible combination of higher
natural gas demand resulting from accelerated electricity growth and air
quality restrictions, coupled with a limitation on alternate fuel use also
resulting from these same air quality constraints (EPRI 1990, Vol I, p. 15). This
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scenario is the type of situation that electric utilities are concerned about
as they increase natural gas in their fuel mix.
Besides constructing the right scenarios, it is not easy to determine
how many to build. The tradeoff is between having many scenarios, which
increases the likelihood that one will be right versus the time constraints
faced by planners along with the limits on their managers' mental capacity
to consider all of these possibilities (Mintzberg, p. 248). Even once the set
of scenarios is selected, it is not clear what to do when the analysis is
complete. Does management bet on the most probable scenario, the one
with the best outcome for the firm, hedge as to get satisfactory results no
matter which one occurs, preserve flexibility, or go out and exert influence
to make the most desirable scenario a reality (Mintzberg, p. 249)? Each
one of these five choices has its own costs, and a clear means of
convincing management to follow a specific course of action does not
exist.
Deterministic models only provide a deterministic answer to the
question that the modeler is asking: they cannot give a range of
probabilities that the answer might assume. Using sensitivity analysis does
not solve this problem. Although this analysis can help bound the answer
generated, it cannot assign a weight to different outcomes. The selection
of another set of assumptions to use in an evaluation does not give the
decision maker any idea of the likelihood of this set. Usually sensitivity
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assumptions are selected to result in a different answer, otherwise there is
little point in conducting the analysis. For example, in the evaluation of
natural gas fired plants, planners use a high price scenario as a sensitivity
case.
Since sensitivity analysis is usually directed at conditions that might
reverse the conclusion suggested by a base case analysis, it does not
consider conditions that make the base case even more favorable.
Ignoring this potential upside results in underestimating the economic
benefits of the project being evaluated. In the above example, the
potential for natural gas prices to decrease and the associated economic
value is not captured by sensitivity analysis. Not only is this type of sensitivity
analysis not performed, there is a danger that the forecasts to support this
analysis are not made either. This can further skew the analysis, resulting in
the base case taking on the role of being the lower bound for natural gas
prices when in fact it is the expected stream of future prices.
The Advantages of Modeling Natural Gas Prices Using a Random Walk
The difficulties in forecasting future prices combined with the
shortcomings of deterministic models suggest using a different approach.
"(I)t is worthwhile to recognize the complex and interconnected nature of
uncertain quantities. When coupled with the realization that no one can
reliably and accurately predict the future, as analysts we are left with
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having to quantify effects after setting reasonable limits of uncertain
phenomena using judgement and some working knowledge of how one
set of circumstances are linked to others. Often this can be accomplished
using probabilities which capture both the uncertainty of data and
judgement (EPRI 1993, pp. 2-3)."
One method is modeling natural gas price movements as a random
walk using past price movements as a guide to price volatility. The ability
to use such a model is fairly recent, not because the techniques were not
available, but because of the regulated structure of the natural gas
industry. EPRI acknowledged this in 1990: "An industry which has
undergone the market and structural upheavals that natural gas has
experienced, provides little reliable historic experience on which to base
forecasts of the way that future supply and demand will respond to price
(EPRI 1990, Vol , p. 3)." However, the establishment of a natural gas spot
and futures market in May of 1990 now provides the necessary data to
base volatility estimates on.
The use of a random walk to model asset price movements is well
established. The famous Black-Scholes formula that prices financial options
assumes that asset prices have a random or Brownian motion component
and evolve over time according to a Wiener process, also called log
normal diffusion (Figlewski, et al, p. 90). Given these assumptions about the
random nature of the asset's value, its return over any period will be
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normally distributed and its price will be lognormal (Figlewski, et al, p. 90).
Using this framework, a quantity of natural gas is the asset, its price is the
cost of that quantity, and its return is the percent change in price from one
day to the next.
In- the case of raw commodities, such as natural gas, their price
movements have both been modeled as Brownian motion, which has the
consequence of prices wandering far away from their starting point, or as
a mean reverting process (Dixit and Pindyck, p. 62). In a mean reverting
process, the price is assumed to return to its average at a specified rate.
"In other words, while in the short run the price of oil might fluctuate
randomly up and down (in response to wars or revolutions in oil-producing
countries, or in response to the strengthening or weakening of the OPEC
cartel), in the longer run it ought to be drawn back towards the marginal
cost of producing oil (Dixit and Pindyck, p. 62)." A similar argument can be
made for natural gas. However the same authors acknowledge that it
usually requires many years of data to determine with any degree of
confidence whether a variable is mean reverting (p. 77).
Two simplifications are made in the Monte Carlo simulation that is
used. First, natural gas and coal prices are assumed not to be mean
reverting or that their rate of reversion is slow enough that it can be
ignored. This is consistent with the case of crude oil and many other
economic variables for time periods of less than 40 years. The random walk
28
hypothesis cannot be rejected over these lengths of time (Dixit and
Pindyck, p. 78). Secondly, a discrete binomial model is used. Prices are
assume to increase or decrease by a given amount based on their
historical volatility. During every discrete increment in time, taken to be one
year, prices have a equal probability of increasing or decreasing.
The advantages of using a binomial model is that it has an intuitive
structure and mathematical tractability (Figlewski, et al, pp. 80-81). By
taking the binomial model to its limiting case, that is taking smaller price
changes over shorter time intervals, it approaches the continuous-time
model, which more advanced tools such as stochastic calculus can be
employed (Dixit and Pindyck, p. 62). Although such methods will not be
used here, it is important to note that they are available to refine the
binomial model's conclusions.
A random walk model acknowledges that future prices are uncertain
and is consistent with theories of market efficiency. It uses known
information to project random movement of price over time. The asset's
current price is known with certainty, and its volatility, subject to estimation
errors, can be easily determined. This helps in eliminating potential biases
in future price estimates. Since future prices only depend on the previous
price, this model is consistent with weak-form market efficiency. This theory
states that prices fully reflect past price information. Therefore, by basing
price forecasts on market information, the model takes advantage of the
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market's knowledge about the asset without knowing specifically which
piece of market information is driving prices. Most studies in the abundant
literature testing market efficiency agree that capital markets are weak
form efficient (Vila, p. 112). Even if market imperfections exist, they will be
mitigated by arbitragers who will earn profits by bringing mispriced assets
back to an equilibrium level consistent with available information.
For completeness, it should be mentioned that some authors disagree
with the market efficiency hypothesis (Shiller, 1991). Their argument is that
an excess in price volatility exists relative to predictions of efficient market
theories due to psychological factors. These psychological factors are
caused by popular mental models about the market that influences
people's behavior resulting in excess volatility. This excess means that if
prices movements were rescaled down to be less variable, then price
would do a better job of forecasting fundamentals (Shiller, 1991, p. 2). If
popular models result in exaggerating volatility, then the distribution in the
net present cost of the binomial model will have an overstated variance.
For the purpose of this model, it is assumed that this volatility excess is
negligible or that over long periods of time, such as thirty years, upside
excesses are negated by downside excess.
A specific example using oil prices illustrates how the natural gas
market incorporates all available price information including data from
other markets. As explained above, the inability to predict natural gas
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prices is partly due to the inability to predict oil prices. If oil prices are too
high relative to natural gas, those that can switch from oil to natural gas will
do so, pushing natural gas prices up and lowering oil prices. In this way the
oil and natural gas markets are linked because of the potential arbitrage
across markets. Some of the cross market arbitrage opportunities have
become institutionalized. For example, the crack spread, which is the
simultaneous purchase (sale) of crude oil futures and sale (purchase) of
petroleum product futures, connects the crude oil market with the market
of its refined products such as heating oil and gasoline (Edwards and Ma,
p. 398).
Like any forecasting method, the binomial model bases future
predictions on past information. This assumes that the relationship between
the forces that drove past price movements do not change over time. Of
course this is not the case, particularly with natural gas, which has a long
history of being subject to various regulations. Table 2.2 lists the four major
regulatory eras of natural gas. Moreover, other factors will change the
underlining volatility, such as expansion of gas storage facilities or regulatory
restrictions on dual-fired units. These structural changes impact all
forecasting techniques; however, in the case of a random walk model,
these changes can easily be incorporated into the analysis.
Suppose that regulators are considering restricting the use of oil in
dual-fired units to reduce air pollution. Adoption of such restrictions will raise
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the price of natural gas. However, before the regulations are approved,
speculators will enter the market betting one way or another that the
regulations will be approved or disapproved in hopes of making a profit.
As the regulations gain momentum, not only will more speculators take
positions but so will firms who want to hedge their natural gas positions
against price increases. These market movements will be captured by the
random walk analysis in two ways. First, the initial price that the analysis
uses, which is the current price, will change, reflecting the market's trend
towards higher prices. Second, the volatility measurements will change,
appropriately reflecting the best information about future trends.
Table 2.2 Eras of Federal Regulatory Involvement in the Natural Gas Industry
Time Period Regulatory Policy
1816 - 1937 Total lack of federal involvement
1938 - 1953 Interstate transmission and sale regulation based on
public convenience and necessity
1954 - 1977 Federal regulation of natural gas wellhead prices
After 1978 Gradual deregulation of gas-producing industry
Source: Castaneda 1993, pp. 2-3.
Unlike models that depend on expert forecasts, which take time to
develop and are expensive to commission, recalculation of volatility can
be done quickly, inexpensively, and at any frequency that management
needs. Depending on the size of the changes in current price and volatility,
management can decide whether or not it is worthwhile to perform
additional evaluations of proposed projects. For instance, if a utility is
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comparing a coal versus a natural gas plant, and market conditions
change sufficiently, the analysis can be updated. Not only will high profile
structural changes be captured in the random walk model, but other less
publicized changes will as well. If someone discovers a technological
improvement, as it is used and its impacts are measured, those that know
about it will take appropriate market positions, which will be reflected in the
marketplace.
Section Two: Natural Gas Prices and Volatility
This section presents evidence that supports modeling natural gas
price movements as a random walk. It is divided into two major parts. Part
one presents natural gas prices since the start of the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) natural gas spot and futures market in 1990 through
early 1994. The second part contains the volatility calculations used in the
Monte Carlo simulation.
Figure 2.1 graphs natural gas prices over the four year period that the
market has been in existence. It also includes four rolling averages based
on the previous 60, 90, 120, and 240 trading days. As expected, longer
period averages are flatter, which means during price increases they are
lower than shorter period averages and during price drops they are
relatively higher. The strong seasonal effects are also present: prices have
ranged from $2.30/MMBtu in the winter to $1.25/MMBtu in the summer.
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There appears to be an increasing trend in prices over the four years, most
clearly shown by the 240 day rolling average, although part of this trend is
due to inflation. The prices are reported in current dollars, meaning that
they are not inflation adjusted.
The volatility measurements are based on the standard deviations of
the change in the natural logarithm of gas prices and are expressed as an
annual rate using a 260 day trading year. In order for this to be a
reasonable approach to modeling fuel prices, these price changes should
be a normal distribution (Dixit and Pindyck, p. 70). Figure 2.2 presents a
frequency distribution of natural gas price changes over the four year
period along with the theoretical normal distribution. As can be seen, the
actual distribution is not a perfect match with its theoretical one. It is
leptokurtic, meaning that it is more peaked than a normal distribution. For
other commodities, Plourde and Watkins ({1993, p. 9) have found that some
of the underlying price distributions are platykurtic (copper, lead, nickel,
zinc, gold, silver, and wheat), meaning that they are fatter than a normal
distribution, whereas others (crude oil, aluminum, and tin) are leptokurtic.
The actual distribution is slightly positively skewed, which reflects the upward
trend denoted by the 240 day average line.
Although the match between the actual and theoretical distributions
is not perfect, it is close enough to justify the assumption that natural gas
prices move according to a log normal diffusion. First, the price change or
34
actual distribution shown in Figure 2.2 has certain key characteristics of a
normal distribution. Its values near its mean occur with more frequency
than values further away from the mean, and the mean occurs in the
middle of the distribution, not on one side or the other. Second, it is clear
that a lognormal diffusion is only an approximation to actual price behavior
(Figlewski, et al, p. 90). Price changes are discontinuous when the market
is closed overnight or during weekends. Moreover, the volatility changes
randomly over time, which will cause a mismatch between the actual and
theoretical distributions. Finally, the differences noted are more important
to those actually trading in natural gas, but are less important in planning
over many years. In the case of planning, there are numerous assumptions
that are approximations at best, which have at least the same order of
magnitude mismatch that is occurring with the natural gas price modeling.
However, to try to capture some of the cause of the mismatch
between actual and theoretical price change distributions, the volatility is
assumed to be a random variable. Figure 2.3 graphs the frequency of
various 60 day annualized volatilities over the four year period. Every 30
trading days the volatility is calculated using the past 60 prices and
annualized based on a 260 day trading year. Figure 2.4 is a frequency plot
of the volatilities, and Table 2.3 is a listing of some key statistical properties
of this volatility distribution. The volatility is modeled as normal distribution
in the Monte Carlo simulation.
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The selection of the number of past prices to use in a volatility
calculation involves a tradeoff between statistical accuracy and changing
volatility over time. Moreover, there is no general agreement on whether
it is better to use daily prices or those from longer periods of time. In
practice, analysts estimate volatility based on using 1 to 6 months of past
daily prices (Figlewski, et al, p. 96). The sample size of sixty prices was
selected to provide enough measurements over a four year period to
determine if volatility changed over time while still having a large enough
sample size to ensure sufficient statistical accuracy. Additional means of
measuring volatility are presented in chapter thirteen of Figlewski, et al.
Coal prices are assumed to behave similar to natural gas but with a
normal volatility distribution with mean 10% and standard deviation of 5%.
This is one of several areas identified in chapter four requiring additional
research.
Table 2.3 Key Statistical Properties of 60 Day Annualized Volatility
Section Three: Model Assumptions
The key characteristics of the natural gas and coal fired units are
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Statistic Value
Average 44.1%
Standard Deviation 15.52%
Maximum 70.91%
Minimum 10.64%
Sample Size 26
from a long range study prepared for the New England Power Pool
(NEPOOL, 1991). These characteristics include the technical attributes of
the power plants, their construction costs and lead times, operation and
maintenance (O&M) charges, and fuel transportation costs. A utility's cost
of capital is assumed to be 11.8%, which is based on the weighted average
cost of capital for New England utilities (NEPOOL, 1991, p. 5). The major
assumptions are presented in Table 2.4.
The assumptions used are generic to the New England region. Any
specific comparison between two power plants would incorporate more
detailed information. Since the Monte Carlo simulation is spreadsheet
based, changing assumptions or adding more detail can be done quickly.
The purpose of using the NEPOOL planning assumptions is not to replicate
a specific comparison between two power plants, but to use a consistent
set of assumptions to construct a stylized example.
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Table 2.4 Major Technical and Cost Assumptions
Assumption Value
General Assumptions
Real Discount Rate 11.8%
In Service Date January 1st, 2000
Plant Size 600 MW
Plant Life 25 years
Capacity Factor 80%
Inflation 3%
Natural Gas Unit
Heat Rate (Btu/KWh) 8,374
Capital Costs ($/KW) 490
Construction Lead Time (months) 60
O&M Fixed ($/KW-Yr) 8.09
O&M Variable ($/MWh) 1.97
1995 Starting Fuel Price ($/MMBtu) 2.87
Coal Unit
Heat Rate (BTU/KWh) 9,457
Capital Costs ($/KW) 1500
Construction Lead Time (months) 89
O&M Fixed ($/KW-Yr) 27.17
O&M Variable ($/MWh) 6.47
1995 Starting Fuel Price ($/MMBtu) 1.68
Rote: All costs are in 1990 dollars.
Section Four: Model Details
Due to computational restrictions of the Monte Carlo simulation
program that is used, several modeling limitations are imposed. The model
starts with an estimate for the price of natural gas and coal for 1995. This
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price is taken from NEPOOL 1991 and is escalated to 1995 using fuel
escalators reported in the same document and includes delivery to New
England. This price is then assumed to follow a random walk. However,
since the natural gas and coal power plants have a twenty-five year life
and do not come on line until the year 2000, the random walk must cover
thirty years. This would result in 23° or over one billion prices. Since the
program used does not have the ability to calculate prices as it proceeds
through its random walk, the potential prices have to be determined before
hand. With over a billion prices, this was not possible.
Instead, it is assumed that every five years, starting in the year 2000,
prices move randomly.' For the years in between the five year intervals, the
fuel prices are escalated from the last previously selected random price at
inflation. These rates are reported in Table 2.4. For example, in the year
2000, there are two possible prices for natural gas based on the volatility of
45% +/- 15%. The program randomly picks a volatility based on the
distribution in Figure 2.4. Assume it selects 45% for its first random walk.
Starting with the given 1995 price of $2.87/MMBtu, the two prices in 2000
are $4.82/MMBtu or $1.83/MMBtu, escalated for inflation. For the years 2001
through 2004, whatever price is selected for 2000, it is escalated yearly as
described above.
1 The implicit effect of this assumption is that natural gas price volatility is modeled as
the fifth root of the annual volatility based on daily variations. The same is true of the assumed
coal price volatility. Converting annual volatilities to a five year period results in a volatility
greater than 100%, which makes it impossible to model a down price movement.
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In the year 2005 the process is repeated. This time there are four
possible prices: $6.99/MMBtu, $2.65/MMBtu (twice), and $1.01/MMBtu.
These four prices are associated with two increases, an increase and then
a decrease, a decrease and then an increase, and two decreases
respectively starting with the price in 1995. This process is repeated for the
years 2010, 2015, and 2020, with the same price escalation occurring
between each five year random price selection. At the end of the random
walk through the year 2020, the net present fuel cost is calculated and
recorded. This process is repeated for a total of 2000 times. The result is a
net present price distribution. The next chapter reports the model results for
different scenarios.
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Fig. 2.1 Natural Gas Prices & Averages
Time (Year,Month,Day)
Price ........ 60 Day Avg. - 90 Day Avg.
....... 120 Day Avg. -- 240 Day Avg
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Fig 2.2 Frequency Plot of Price Change
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Chapter 3
Analytical Framework and Simulation Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the analytical framework that is used to
evaluate the model's results. Section one describes the framework using
the assumptions listed in chapter two. The mean variance efficient portfolio
using two assets, a coal plant and a natural gas plant, are calculated. A
riskless asset is introduced and is assumed to be a fixed price gas contract.
Section two draws some conclusions.
Section One: Analytical Framework Simulation Results
Financial portfolio theory is used to compare a natural gas fired plant
to a coal fired one. One underlying assumption is when the given
investments have the same mean return, investors prefer projects that have
a lower variance or standard deviation. For electric power plants,
regulators prefer projects with lower cost variance, when expected costs
are equal. This is reflected in Figure 3.1 (a). It graphs the net present cost
(NPC) of two hypothetical projects versus their mean plus and minus their
first and second standard deviations. Since both projects have the same
expected cost, regulators prefer the one with less variance, the coal fired
power plant.
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Unfortunately, the situation may not be so clear cut. The question
becomes what should regulators prefer if the means of the two projects are
not equal, with the higher variance project having the lower expected
NPC? This question is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (b). The answer depends on
the covariance between the two projects. For example, assume that the
projects are perfectly correlated, meaning that when the cost of one
project increases, the other increases as well. For 75% (within one standard
deviation) of the time, the cost of the coal power plant will be more
expensive than the natural gas fired plant. If the covariance is less than
one, there will be situations that the coal project's cost is less than the
natural gas fired plant. For any given covariance, there exists a probability
in which the coal plant may be cheaper than the natural gas plant.
The results presented in Table 3.1, Figure 3.2 (a) and Figure 3.2 (b)
shows that a gas fired plant is a clear winner over coal. Figure 3.2 (a) is a
graphical representation of Table 3.1. The large difference in capital costs
are driving this phenomenon. In addition, the coal plant has larger NPCs
for both fixed and variable O&M than the gas plant. As a result, the large
natural gas fuel net present costs and potential increases do not overcome
coal's capital and O&M NPC disadvantages except two standard
deviations away.
The fuel net present cost distributions for coal and natural gas are
presented in Figures 3.2 (c) and 3.2 (d). Since natural gas volatility is so
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large, it has a significant probability of reaching values near zero over a
period of twenty five years. These extremely small values for natural gas
prices become the minimum value for the fuel NPC and as a result, restrict
natural gas' volatility compared to that of coal. This results in coal's volatility
being disproportionately large compared to that of natural gas.
Table 3.1 Results of Analysis
Coal Natural Gas
NPC Percent of NPC Percent of
(Millions 1990 $) Total Cost (Millions 1990 $) Total Cost
Capital 466.6 48.8% 152.4 22.6%
Fixed O&M 80.4 8.49% 23.9 3.5%
Variable O&M 134.2 14.0% 40.9 6.1%
Fuel 274.1 28.7% 457.3 67.8%
TOTAL 955.3 674.5
ote: Numbers may not add up to 100 percen due to rounding.
The distributions of net present fuel costs presented in Figures 3.2 (c)
and 3.2 (d) have several characteristics that should be commented on.
First, they are jagged. This is an artifact of the modeling described in
chapter two, section four. Since price movements are modeled as a
discrete process following a random walk every five years, this results in
discontinuities in the fuel cost distributions. Second, it should be noted that
these fuel distributions have a lognormal shape. This is characterized by a
minimum value, a peak, and an extended tail of maximum values. The
implications of being a lognormal distribution is that the standard deviation
no longer identifies with equal probabilities both an increase and decrease
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in net present fuel costs, which is the case with a normal distribution. The
impact is that upward movements will be understated. However, since this
effect is relatively minor, it can be ignored without distorting the conclusions
derived from the results.
Before financial portfolio theory is introduced to address these issues,
a simple method of modeling the two plants' variances needs to be
presented. The actual variances are determined from the modeling
process, which explains their difference from the ones calculated using this
simple model. It is assumed that a plant consists of two factors, capital (K)
and fuel (F). The NPC of a plant depends on the sum of these two factors,
and the fractions that each factor contributes to the total NPC are k and
f. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 express NPC both in terms of dollars and percent.
NPC($) = K + F (3.1)
NPC(%) = k*K + f*F (3.2)
The variance (STD2) for the NPC(%) is
STD2 = k2*STD2k + f2*STD2f + 2*k*f*STDk,f (3.3)
where STD2k and STD2f are the capital and fuel variances respectively and
STDk,f is the covariance between fuel and capital.
Both this simple model and the actual model assume that the capital
expenses have a variance of zero, which implies that its covariance with
fuel is also zero. For the purposes of this simple model, all non-fuel costs are
considered capital expenditures. Equation (3.3) simplifies to
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STD2T = f2*STD2 f (3.4)
This is a reasonable simplification. First, utilities can sign turnkey contracts,
which insulate them from the risk of cost overruns, increases in interest rates,
and other changes that effect a power plant's construction charges.
Second, in a comparison between a coal and a natural gas plant, both
are susceptible to the same capital risk, although the coal plant has a
larger exposure because it has larger capital costs. The implication is that
the covariance between each of these two plants' capital costs is very
close to one. Therefore, if capital costs do increase or decrease for one
plant, the same occurs with the other. Table 3.2 calculates the total
standard deviation using the simple model (Equation 3.4) and reports the
standard deviations from the actual model. The disproportionate effect
mentioned above due to the limits on natural gas price movements due to
the floor of zero is reflected in Table 3.2 in the total standard deviation for
the actual model.
Table 3.2 Fuel and NPC Variances Using Base Case Results
Fina ncia I portfolio theory compares the return of various combinations
of several assets to the associated risk of these assets (Sharpe & Alexander,
Chapters 7 and 8). This theory can be applied to power plants by
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f STDf STDT STDT
Simple Model Actual Model
Natural Gas 52.2% 45.0% 23.5% 17.6%
Coal 16.2% 10.0% 1.6% 4.6%
replacing the plants' returns with their cost (Awerbuch, October 1993). The
equations that map the risk-cost relationship are
STD2 = g2 *STD2g + c2*STD2c + 2*g*c*STDg,c (3.5)
NPC = g*E(NPCg) + c*E(NPCc) (3.6)
STDgc = Cg,c *STDg *STDc (3.7)
where g and c are the fractions of gas and coal assets, and E(NPC)
represents the expected net present cost of the power plant corresponding
to its subscript. Equation 3.7 states the relationship between the correlation
coefficient, c, and the covarinces and standard deviations. Figure 3.3 plots
the results. Each solid block represents a 10% change in the fuel mix
between natural gas and coal. (The correlation coefficient of 1 does not
have solid blocks for clarity.) As the graph demonstrates, the risk-cost
relationship is heavily dependent on the covariance between the two
assets, which means the covariance between natural gas and coal prices.
One author has reported a covariance of 0.94 (Awerbuch, October 1993,
Table 1), although this was based on only 16 data points using U.S. wide
averages for coal and gas prices.
Different correlation coefficients are selected to demonstrate
parametricly the effect that covariance has on risk diversification. A
correlation coefficient of zero means that the fuel movements are
independent of one another. Although this may not be a good assumption
for natural gas and coal, it illustrates how this same portfolio analysis can be
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volatility) reduction at a large cost when starting near the 100% natural gas
point. This conclusion is driven by two factors working together. Coal prices
are assumed to be very stable, and, since coal costs are only a small
portion of the total plant's cost, the impact of coal price volatility is
reduced furthered. If coal price volatility played a larger role in a coal
plant's NPC, then fuel diversification would make more sense, particularly
if coal prices move counter to natural gas prices. However, the benefits of
diversification, which occurs when the lines in the portfolio graphs become
curved, are small and only occur when moving from a very large
percentage of coal in the fuel mix towards natural gas. In fact, natural gas
plants should be built to diversify away from coal.
Sensitivity analysis confirms these results for larger coal price volatility,
increasing natural gas prices in real terms, and decreasing coal prices in
real terms over the life of the power plants, although the magnitude of the
difference between the expected NPC of the two plants does change.
Any analysis performed on actual investment opportunities would use
updated assumptions and site specific values.
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Figure 3.1 (a) Natural Gas vs Coal
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Chapter 4
Implications and Limitations of the Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter places the results in a policy framework and proposes
areas for additional research. Section one answers two questions:
Should electric utilities adopt measures to mitigate the risk of natural
gas price increases?
Assuming that some type of hedging strategy should be adopted,
should utilities use fuel switching or financial contracts as a means of
protecting themselves from natural gas price increases?
Definite answers will not be provided, but instead reasonable decision
making criteria will be proposed. Section two suggests areas for additional
research. This includes discussions on empirical questions, such as
measuring coal fuel price volatility, and theoretical issues, such as methods
of placing an economic value on fuel diversity.
Section One: Policy Framework
Should Measures be Adopted to Mitiaate the Risk of Natural Gas Price
Increases?
The large natural gas volatility measurements presented in chapter
two, combined with the large fraction that fuel costs contribute to total
power plant costs, result in a $150 million potential up or down swing in the
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NPC of a natural gas plant at one standard deviation for the base case
(see figure 3.2 (b)). This $150 million is 22.6% of the NPC of the natural gas
plant and is large enough to consider price mitigation strategies. These
strategies must cost less than the potential worse case they are preventing.
This depends on the risk level that is desired. For one standard deviation,
the mitigation strategy should not cost more than approximately $150
million. However, if a two standard deviation risk level must be met, then
a strategy should not cost more than $300 million. For simplicity, the
following analysis will use the base case numbers assuming that one
standard deviation risk level is desired. The selection of this risk level is
arbitrary
A distinction needs to be made between the absolute cost of the
strategy and its expected payoff. A price mitigation strategy might have
a negative expected value but still be an intelligent option so long as its
total cost is less than the potential downside that is being hedged. For
example, insurance has a negative expected payoff, but no one would
purchase a policy whose total premiums are $100 to protect a $50 piece
of property. However, they may pay $25 in premiums to protect the same
property with an expected payoff of -$10. In the base case, $150 million
serves as a cost cap for any mitigation strategy.
After establishing that there exists enough volatility to warrant
mitigation, the next step is to identify a reason to protect against price
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increases. There are two generic reasons why a utility would want to
hedge natural gas prices. The first is to raise capital for future investments.
The argument is that as electricity rates rise, particularly dramatic increases
relative to other parts of the country, the cost of capital increases.
Hedging fuel price increases would allow utilities to save overall by limiting
their capital expenses. In general, this argument is not persuasive. Due to
the industry's large capital structure, it has access to financial markets.
Moreover, under current regulatory policy, the assets that the industry builds
are guaranteed a return, which makes capital acquisition easier for the
utility industry than for other firms. Finally, when electricity prices increase,
demand for electricity decreases. This means that the need for future
power projects is reduced, which translates into less capital demand.
The second possible reason for price hedging is to provide a service
to utility customers. This argument assumes that customers desire fuel price
hedging and that the utility can provide a hedging solution at a lower price
than the customer. If this is not the case, then the customer would hedge
the price risk without the utility's involvement. A utility has several ways in
which it can have a comparative advantage in hedging over its customers.
These comparative advantages may come from a utility's information
resources or economies of scale.
Moreover, customers may be in a position that they cannot afford to
hedge fuel prices and if prices increase dramatically enough they will leave
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the service area by moving or closing their business. As customers leave
the area, fixed costs are spread over fewer consumers, further increasing
rates. This can result in a vicious circle, and if it is significant enough can
also depress economic growth, further reducing electricity demand and
raising rates. In this way, the preservation of rate base by hedging prices
can be viewed as an investment undertaken by the utility. This means that
standard net present value techniques can be used to evaluate whether
different price mitigation strategies should be undertaken.
Using the base case results, customers are exposed to a potential
$150 million increase in net present cost for benefits of 4,204,800 MWh each
year for twenty five years. Discounting these benefits at the same rate that
the costs are, consumers receive 12,339,858 MWh of net present benefits
(NPB). Spreading the $150 million over these benefits, the price exposure
is $0.0122/KWh or slightly more than one cent per KWh. For the average
household using 7,500 KWh/year, this translates into a price exposure of
$91.17. Given this small risk exposure, a blanket hedging strategy to protect
all consumers does not seem to be worthwhile. These increase on a per
KWh basis are over the twenty-five year life of the power plants.
This does not mean that none of the customer classes should not be
protected. Industrial customers in which electricity constitutes a large
component of their costs and who are operating on thin margins, are an
example. These customers pay lower prices per KWh than residential
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consumers because they receive their power at higher voltages, which
means they do not pay for the same level of distribution equipment services
that residential customers do. As a result, their electric bill is more sensitive
to fuel price increases than residential customers. In addition, by definition
these customers are using a lot of electricity, which helps spread the utility's
large fixed costs over more KWh sales. Whether or not a price mitigation
strategy should be pursued for these customers depends on a host of
empirical questions, such as the customer's price elasticity for electricity,
their total usage, and their ability to withstand price increases given the
industry they are in.
To answer the question that leads off this section, there does not
appear to be a compelling reason for electric utilities to hedge natural gas
price increase for all customers. While potential increases in natural gas
prices may result in large absolute NPC, these costs are relatively small in
terms of their effect on customers' electric bills. There may be situations in
which certain classes of customers could benefit from a hedging strategy,
but this depends on a case by case basis.
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If Utilities Decide to Pursue a Hedging Strategy, Should They Use Fuel
Switching or Financial Contracts as a Means of Protecting Themselves from
Natural Gas Price Increases?
There are many methods of hedging natural gas price increases, but
they tend to fall into two categories: engineering solutions and financial
contracts. Engineering methods include fuel diversification and fuel
switching. Fuel switching includes the use of distillate oil in the winter
instead of natural gas, and other options such as building a coal gasifier
next to an existing natural gas fired plant. Financial options include fixed
price contracts, payment swaps between utilities or customers, options, and
futures contracts. All of these financial and engineering options depend on
their efficiency in trading the upside potential of decreased natural gas
prices for protection from the downside of raising prices.
The preceding analysis concludes that is probably not worth trying to
protect all customers from natural gas price increases. This suggests that
blanket engineering solutions, such as building coal plants to diversify a
utility's fuel mix, are not the most efficient strategy because customers that
do not need price protection end up paying for it. In addition, the results
from chapter three clearly show that a coal plant costs approximately $300
million more in net present costs than the natural gas plant. This is $150
million more than the net present cost of high natural gas price exposure
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at one standard deviation.
However, engineering solutions that behave similarly to a financial
option may be worth pursuing. For example, it may be prudent to
purchase extra land near a combined cycle natural gas fired plant that
can be used to build a coal gasifier. If natural gas prices increase above
a threshold level, then building the gasifier becomes economical and acts
as a hedge against further price hikes. A similar argument can be made
for other engineering solutions such as conservation measures. One key
characteristic of these types of option approaches is that their initial cost
(the amount that has to be spent before it is determined whether or not to
exercise the option; in the case of the gasifier, this cost is the additional
land) must be less than the worse case price exposure. Another factor is
that a decision can be made at a later time based on additional
information to determine whether to exercise the option, and that the
option can be implemented quickly enough to have some benefit. For
example, if it takes five years to build the gasifier, its value is less than if it
takes only two years.
Financial tools to hedge price risk have the advantage over
engineering solutions in that they can be tailored more easily to the risk and
do not have the costs associated with constructing the equipment that is
used to hedge the risk. However, financial options introduce third party risk,
or the possibility of whomever ends up holding the losing side of the
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transaction will not pay according to previously agreed upon terms. This
fear is well founded in New England due to the numerous oil contracts that
were broken as a result of the oil embargo in the early 1970s.
Some of the financial and engineering risk mitigation strategies can
be implemented dynamically. This means that the mitigation strategy does
not have to be implemented when the natural gas plant is built. It can be
purchased at a later time. For example, the land for a coal gasifier could
be bought when natural gas prices become high enough. If they continue
to increase, then the gasifier itself can be built. The same is true with future
or option contracts. A strategy of hedging natural gas prices by purchasing
future contracts can be adjusted as prices change: the higher natural gas
prices go the more contracts are purchased and the greater the
percentage of the risk is hedged.
Although it is impossible here to examine in detail all possible
engineering and financial strategies available to hedge natural gas prices,
several litmus tests can be proposed. First, the expected cost of the
hedging strategy must be less than the worse case situation it is designed
to mitigate. The random walk model provides a reasonable method to
estimate these possible worse cases as well as able to assign probabilities
to these outcomes. Second, mitigation methods that can be tailored to
those that have the most to benefit from hedging provide the most value
added. Third, strategies that have flexibility are worth pursuing particularly
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if their initial costs are low and they can be implemented quickly.
Section Two: Limitations of the Model and Areas for Additional Research
Empirical Values
The results presented in chapter three are based on a variety of
assumptions, some of which require additional research. The first set of
assumptions are empirical ones. These involve values such as the
correlation coefficient between natural gas and coal prices, the variance
of coal, the mean reversion tendency if any of natural gas, and the
differences in these values among different markets. As the base case
portfolio graph in chapter three demonstrates (Figures 3.3), different
correlation coefficients can result in different levels of risk reduction for a
given cost.
Market differences impact a variety of assumptions. The results
assume that the same natural gas volatility that occurs at Henry Hub occurs
in New England, although there is an additional expense that is not volatile
to account for transportation. Although this is reasonable since most
contracts at Henry Hub are not taken for delivery, this assumption may not
hold true. Regional variations could also impact other values, such as
coal's volatility and its correlation with local natural gas markets. The
importance of nailing down these regional specific values depends on the
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use of random walk modeling. Long term planning does not require as
precise measurements given the host of other assumptions made over
many years, and its goal of identifying trends and relationships instead of
precisely predicting future values. However, if a random walk model is used
for shorter horizon risk management, these regional variations become
much more important. In any event, it is worthwhile to have estimates on
these regional differences even if they serve to confirm the assumption that
they can be ignored.
Theoretical Considerations
Besides the empirical values that need to be estimated, there are
some important theoretical considerations. Two will be examined in some
detail. The first is system interactions. The model compares two plants in
isolation from the system that they operate in. It could do this because it
assumed that the plants are baseload facilities and would be dispatched
every year at a specified rate. This is also a reasonable assumption under
contracting situations in which an operator of a power plant promises to
deliver power at a certain price over many years.
However, there is another system interaction that must be accounted
for. The portfolio curves compares various levels of a coal and natural gas
plant without reference to the current fuel mix that these plants operate in
and without consideration of how these fuel mixes will change over time.
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In fact, the premise behind the two questions addressed previously is that
in the future, after utilities have significantly increased natural gas in their
fuel mix, they should use coal to diversify their dependance on gas. If full
use of the random walk model is to occur, it must also address current fuel
mixes as they evolve over time. Portfolio theory can easily calculate fuel
diversity statically using results generated by the random walk model, but
combining this dynamically with a dispatch model is much more difficult
computationally.
The only quick fix is to use the random walk model with portfolio
theory to generate snapshots of fuel diversity impacts. Since there are
commercial portfolio models that can handle many assets, the random
walk model can be used for all of the different power generating assets a
utility has and then imported into a portfolio model. In collecting the
required data for all of these assets, the same empirical difficulties
mentioned previously exist. This difficulty will be compounded by
nontraditional resources, such as conservation techniques and renewable
energy resources, since there is little long term experience with them. To
move beyond the quick fix, a model will have to be built mainly from
scratch to combine the dispatching elements with random walk modeling
and portfolio analysis.
The second area of additional theoretical research that will be
discussed is placing a value on fuel diversity. This is motivated by the
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question: How much of a fuel price premium should electric utilities be
willing to pay to ensure themselves of long term fuel supplies at a
predetermined price? This question is extremely important (chapter one,
page 18) to secure financing for pipeline expansions, NUG additions, and
natural gas exploration and development. Moreover, the agreed upon
price premium must hold ex post as well as ex ante. Years into the
contract, when the current price moves away from the contracted price,
a huge incentive exists to find means of breaching the contract. This is
currently happening in New England. Power contracts signed in the late
eighties at high prices based on the expectations of future under capacity
are now being challenged given the region's current power surplus and its
corresponding low market price.
A random walk model can help in answering this price premium
question in two ways. First, it can quantify the impacts and probabilities of
various price movements. This allows the utility to determine whether or not
price risk is substantial enough to warrant mitigation. Second, the random
walk model can also be used to determine how natural gas moves relative
to the economy as a whole; in other words, its beta can be determined.
Knowing this, the premium that should be paid to reduce its beta to an
acceptable level should be able to be calculated.
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